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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






JUSTIN J. ROBERTSON, 




ROBERT GILMORE, Superintendent at SCI Greene; TRACEY SHAWLEY, Sup.  
Assistant/Grievance Coordinator; ROBERT VALLEY, Former, Medical Director; 
MICHAEL HICE, Wexford Administrator; DR. ARTHUR M. SANTOS 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-18-cv-01338) 
Magistrate Judge:  Honorable Cynthia R. Eddy 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 12, 2021 
Before:  CHAGARES, PHIPPS, and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 








* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




Justin Robertson, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from the 
District Court’s order dismissing his civil rights complaint.1  We will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
I. 
In August 2018, Robertson, who is incarcerated at State Correctional Institution 
Greene (“SCI Greene”), initiated a lawsuit in state court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
alleging that various prison personnel violated his Eighth Amendment right to receive 
adequate medical care.  The case was removed to federal court, and Robertson filed an 
amended complaint.  The amended complaint named as defendants the superintendent of 
SCI Greene (Defendant Gilmore), a grievance coordinator (Defendant Shawley), the 
prison’s former medical director (Defendant Valley), a doctor who treated Robertson 
(Defendant Santos), and an administrator for the medical service provider that contracts 
with SCI Greene (Defendant Hice). 
Robertson alleged that on May 24, 2016, he saw Defendant Santos about a severe 
pain in his left shoulder that was causing numbness in his arm and disrupting his sleep.  
The doctor prescribed Robertson a muscle relaxer.  On June 30, Robertson returned, 
complaining that the pain had gotten worse.  Santos prescribed a different muscle relaxer 
and ordered an x-ray.  On July 12, Robertson again returned, explaining that the drug was 
not working.  Santos prescribed a medication to help Robertson sleep.  Later that month, 
 




Robertson had an x-ray and began prescribed physical therapy.  On August 9, the 
physical therapist told Robertson that he believed his pain was coming from a swollen 
disc near his spinal cord, but that an MRI would be needed to be sure. 
On August 30, Robertson again saw Santos, with Hice present.  He explained that 
the physical therapy was making his pain worse and requested pain medication.  He also 
told them what the physical therapist had said about a swollen disc and requested an 
MRI.  Santos told Robertson that his x-ray appeared normal and that an MRI was not 
needed.  Robertson alleged that Hice said that the physical therapist’s recommendation 
“doesn’t matter” because he is not a doctor.  See Am. Complaint, ECF No. 45 at 7.  
Robertson was denied pain medication and told to purchase Motrin from the commissary.  
He filed a grievance that same day, in which he reported that the two defendants “became 
very hostile stating [their] diagnosis is all that counts,” and that he was “kicked out of the 
office.”  See ECF No. 45-1 at 1. 
Robertson was then temporarily transferred to Dauphin County Prison for a reason 
unrelated to the claims in this case.  There, he was seen by medical staff and referred to a 
specialist at Hershey Medical Center.  The specialist told Robertson that he believed he 
had a collapsed disc, and that he suspected surgery was necessary, but that an MRI was 
needed to confirm the diagnosis.  Robertson was returned to SCI Greene on January 12, 
2017, before the MRI could be completed.  He alleged that, upon his return, he informed 




also told other SCI Greene medical staff about his need for an MRI during a sick call 
visit.  Robertson’s family tried to contact Valley multiple times, but no action was taken.  
His family called Hershey Medical Center and got the hospital to send his records to SCI 
Greene. 
On February 9, 2017, Robertson was informed that he was scheduled for an MRI.2  
However, he alleged that the SCI Greene medical staff ordered the wrong MRI, and it 
was rescheduled for July 14, 2017.  The MRI was performed on the rescheduled date.  
Robertson had surgery on August 2, 2017.  He asserts that the defendants’ delayed 
treatment caused him permanent nerve and muscle damage.  Robertson Br. at 15. 
 The defendants moved to dismiss Robertson’s amended complaint for failure to 
state a claim.  On October 2, 2019, the District Court granted the defendants’ motions, 
concluding (1) that Robertson had failed to allege that Gilmore or Shawley were liable 
under § 1983 because they lacked personal involvement in Robertson’s medical 
treatment; (2) that Robertson had failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim against 
Valley, Santos, or Hice; and (3) that further amendment of Robertson’s complaint would 
be futile.  After the District Court denied his motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(b),3 Robertson appealed. 
 
2 In his amended complaint, Robertson did not state who ordered the MRI, who informed 
him that he was scheduled for an MRI, or when the MRI was originally meant to take 
place. 
 





We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise plenary review over 
the District Court’s dismissal of Robertson’s complaint.  See Newark Cab Ass’n v. City 
of Newark, 901 F.3d 146, 151 (3d Cir. 2018).  “To survive a motion to dismiss, a 
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 
that is plausible on its face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  We construe all allegations in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff.  Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012).  
Additionally, we may affirm on any ground supported by the record.  See Munroe v. 
Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 469 (3d Cir. 2015). 
III. 
Robertson argues that the District Court erred in concluding that he failed to state 
a § 1983 claim against Defendants Gilmore, Shawley, and Valley because he did not 
allege their personal involvement as required under Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 
1207 (3rd Cir. 1988).  We disagree.  Non-medical prison officials cannot “be charge[d] 
with the Eighth Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate indifference” when the 
“prisoner is under the care of medical experts.”  Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 
526, 543 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004)).  
 
In re Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that arguments not raised in an 
appellant’s opening brief are forfeited).  The Rule 60(b) motion was filed within 28 days 
of when the District Court’s order dismissing Robertson’s complaint was entered, thus 




Here, Robertson pleaded that he was under the care of medical professionals for the 
duration of the alleged events.  And although “[a] high-ranking prison official can expose 
an inmate to danger by failing to correct serious known deficiencies in the provision of 
medical care to the inmate population,” Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 
324 (3d Cir. 2014), reversed on other grounds by Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822 (2015), 
Robertson did not identify a supervisory policy, practice, or custom that caused him 
harm, see Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989).  Thus, the District 
Court was correct to dismiss Robertson’s claims as to Defendants Gilmore, Shawley, and 
Valley.4 
 We also disagree with Robertson’s argument that the District Court erred in 
dismissing his complaint as to Defendants Santos and Hice.  To succeed on an Eighth 
Amendment medical needs claim, an inmate must demonstrate (1) that the defendants 
showed “deliberate indifference” to his medical needs, and (2) that those needs were 
“serious.”  Pearson, 850 F.3d at 534.  Here, the parties do not dispute that Robertson 
 
4 Although Defendant Valley was the medical director of SCI Greene during the alleged 
events, he was a “high-ranking prison official,” see Barkes, 766 F.3d at 324, and 
Robertson was not under his direct care, see Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236; see also Rode, 845 
F.2d at 1208 (concluding that an administrator reviewing an inmate grievance does not 
rise to the level of “personal involvement” necessary to allege a § 1983 claim).  Besides, 
Robertson failed to allege that Valley exhibited “a mental state of deliberate indifference” 
toward him.  See Spruill, 372 F.3d at 237.  Robertson stated that he notified Valley of his 
need for an MRI after he returned to SCI Greene on January 12, 2017.  Although 
Robertson alleged that Valley never responded to his or his family’s attempts to contact 
him, Robertson was scheduled for an MRI on February 9, 2017, less than one month after 




alleged a serious medical need, and we agree that a collapsed spinal disc that requires 
surgical treatment is, without question, “serious.”  See Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 
266 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that a medical need is “serious if it has been diagnosed by 
a physician as requiring treatment”). 
However, Robertson failed to allege sufficient facts to show that Defendants 
Santos and Hice acted with deliberate indifference.  Although Robertson pleaded that the 
defendants’ treatment choices resulted in undue pain and permanent nerve and muscle 
damage, he was not denied medical care.  On the contrary, Robertson alleged that he 
received continuous care from the defendants.  Where, as here, a prisoner does not allege 
the total denial of medical care but that the medical care he received was inadequate, 
there are two questions we ask when assessing deliberate indifference: (1) whether the 
care the prisoner received was, in fact, inadequate, and (2) whether the defendants 
possessed the requisite state of mind in delivering the care.  Pearson, 850 F.3d. at 535–36. 
Robertson’s claim fails on the second prong.  Regardless of whether he received 
inadequate care, he failed to allege that Defendants Santos and Hice showed more than 
negligence or medical malpractice in making their treatment decisions.  Rouse v. Plantier, 
182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999) (“It is well-settled that claims of negligence or medical 
malpractice, without some more culpable state of mind, do not constitute deliberate 
indifference.”).  While Robertson alleged that his care was delayed, he failed to plead that 




F.2d 64, 68–69 (3d. Cir. 1993).  Rather, he alleged that the defendants refused his initial 
requests for pain medication and an MRI for medical reasons, e.g., on the basis of their 
examination of him and Robertson’s normal-looking x-ray.  See Pearson, 850 F.3d at 538 
(explaining that we are disinclined to second-guess medical professionals’ expertise).  
And Robertson’s allegations that Santos and Hice disparaged his physical therapist’s 
opinion and were hostile toward him do not rise to the level of intentional maliciousness 
or wantonness required to state a violation of the Eighth Amendment.  See Spruill, 372 
F.3d at 237.  Thus, we conclude that Robertson failed to allege sufficient facts to survive 
Santos’ and Hice’s motions to dismiss. 
IV. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
